

The Christian

No. 329

News-Letter

Edited by
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BLISS

19th January, 1949

THE UNITED NATIONS at its meeting in Paris adopted a Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Forty-eight nations voted in favour of it and none against it, but there were eight abstentions. The nations which abstained were the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. The Declaration, copies of which may be obtained from the United Nations Information Centre, Russell Square House, W.C. 1, contains thirty articles. The first declares that :—

“ All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience, and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

The eighteenth article, dealing with religious liberty, is as follows :—

“ Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

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By

ALEX COMFORT

The Churches have taken an active interest in the preparation of the Declaration. The Director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Dr. O. F. Nolde, has attended all, or nearly all, the meetings of the Commission on Human Rights, which have been held at intervals during the past two years. He has kept in continuous touch with the Churches represented in the World Council of Churches and communicated their views to the Commission.

Dr. Nolde has had two main aims in view—first, to obtain a clause which defended not only the formal practice of an existing religion, but also freedom of thought and conscience: for freedom to deny a religion is essential to a true religious freedom. His second aim has been to prevent the passing into the Declaration of vague sentiments of religious liberty and freedom of conscience which, as experience has shown, can in practice be interpreted in a restrictive sense.

In Paris the whole matter was referred to a Committee. Whereas only eighteen nations had taken part in the drafting of the Declaration, all the fifty-eight member States participated in deliberations in committee. The majority of those engaged in the discussions in Paris were new to this task, and many fresh points of view had to be taken account of. Opposition to article 18 came from three distinct groups, which were opposed to the original (which has now become the final) wording of the article.

The first were the Russians and their associated States. The U.S.S.R. submitted an amendment which read: "Everyone must be guaranteed freedom of thought and freedom to perform religious services in accordance with the laws of the country concerned and the requirements of public morality". The Soviet object was basically the same as its object in attempting to amend a number of other articles, namely, to make it explicit that human rights are conferred and upheld by the State.

The second group of objectors were Mohammedan, and the State of Saudi Arabia was one of the States which in the Assembly voted against the whole Declaration. Saudi

Arabia proposed that article 18 should read: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," and that nothing further should be said. The tough battle which religious minorities are having to fight in Moslem countries in the Near East is the clue to the Moslem fear that these minorities might receive strong moral backing from the wording of the second half of article 18. In the plenary session of the General Assembly, however, the delegate of Pakistan, speaking from the standpoint of Islam and quoting the Koran, "unhesitatingly and unequivocally" supported the full text of the article on religious freedom and emphasized in particular the right to change one's religion.

The third group consisted of nations belonging to Latin America. An amendment was proposed by Peru, which recognized only the right "to profess a religious faith and to express it in thought and practice". Since "practice" of a religion is almost always interpreted as "worship", this left out of account the other ways of expressing religious belief enumerated in the article. It also omitted expressions of freedom of conscience other than the specifically religious. The Churches have stood throughout this discussion for freedom of conscience, for liberty in the whole field of human thought and activity, including science and culture, and not merely for freedom of *religious* thought.

Widely different views have been taken of the significance of the adoption by the Assembly of this Declaration of Human Rights. To some the fact that for the first time in history the governments of by far the greater part of the world's population should have reached agreement in a broad definition of human rights and fundamental freedoms seems an achievement which redeems the third session of the United Nations from complete failure. To others the Declaration, unsupported by any provision for enforcement, seems almost worthless. The more pessimistic view is expressed in the following letter from Dr. Eric Fletcher, M.P., who attended some of the discussions in Paris.

"The General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris has come to an end in an atmosphere of disappointment and

disillusion. Some have heralded the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights as its most notable positive achievement ; others may well think that this represents the greatest disappointment and deception of all. When the Charter was drawn up at San Francisco its framers assumed that, because the war against Nazism and Fascism had been preceded by a wholesale and barbaric disregard of human rights by these régimes, the full recognition and establishment of the four freedoms throughout the world was essential for the preservation of world peace. Hitherto the recognition and protection of individual rights has depended entirely upon the internal and domestic systems of particular national States. The Charter is a landmark in treating the status of the individual and his protection as the proper concern of an international society.

“ The original intention was that the Commission on Human Rights should prepare an International Bill of the Rights of Man, containing not only a Declaration in general terms, but also a Convention or Covenant intended to be binding on the member States, with adequate machinery for enforcement, or ‘ implementation ’ as it is colloquially called. This noble conception has been sacrificed to the desire to produce some immediate result, however unreal it may turn out to be.

“ The Declaration of Human Rights consisting of thirty points as adopted in Paris is little more than an empty gesture. It is at best a pious statement of ideals. It confers no legal or enforceable rights on anyone. It contains no sanctions. No provision is made for an individual, or group of individuals, to present a Petition to the Commission on Human Rights. This Declaration does not bear comparison with our own Bill of Rights or with the French Declaration of 1789 or with the American Bill of Rights. All these had legal validity. The Declaration of Human Rights is not, and is not intended to be, binding or enforceable. By many it will be regarded as a mockery and a sham. It will do nothing to release from their misery those millions of human beings (variously estimated at anything between three and four millions) who are suffering in concentration camps or

forced labour camps in Asiatic Russia all the rigours of a tyrannous police state. It will not touch the problems of race discrimination in the United States of America and elsewhere. It will do nothing to remove the threat to world peace to-day which results from the conflicting ideologies of the East and the West, a conflict which extends to the very question of what is meant by fundamental human rights.

“Although we must admire the patient and arduous work which during the last three years has been devoted by the Commission on Human Rights, and indeed many others, to preparing the substance of the Declaration, it is patent to all that the text is couched in language of extreme vagueness. It is only necessary to look at some of the phrases used in the Declaration to see the ambiguities that they contain. What, for example, is meant by ‘freedom of movement and residence’? Do we in England infringe this fundamental right by our Control of Engagements Order and the Orders relating to direction of labour? What is meant by ‘freedom of speech and peaceful assembly’? Should these rights extend to those who desire to advocate either Fascism on the one hand or Communism on the other hand? What, precisely, is the international value of a declaration of freedom from ‘arbitrary arrest’ and of access to ‘impartial law courts’?

“We must regretfully recognize that this Declaration of Human Rights, while attempting to state in simple language basic human rights intended to be of universal application, uses language which more often than not either is so vague as to be meaningless or uses words which have diametrically opposite meanings in different parts of the world. In the present conflict between East and West there is no common acceptance as to the meaning of such basic conceptions as ‘law’, ‘justice’ or ‘freedom’, and it is merely hypocritical to pretend that ‘law’ and ‘justice’ to-day connote the same ideas east of the Iron Curtain as they do in the western democracies or the rest of the world.”

There is obviously force in what Dr. Fletcher writes. No great advance will have been made if things are left where

they are. But there is no decisive reason why they should be so left, and the more that criticisms like those of Dr. Fletcher are pressed home the greater will be the spur to take the next steps. The Declaration has been recognized by the Assembly as the first step towards a legally binding covenant, for which many States have already pledged their support. If there is a determined body of opinion bent on securing the recognition of fundamental rights and freedoms, the hands of reformers all over the world will be strengthened by the fact that forty-eight nations have given their assent to this Declaration. The Declaration provides a starting-point for forming a public opinion throughout the world, which governments may find it increasingly difficult to ignore.

The subject of the natural rights of man has had a long history, and the most contradictory views have been expressed about it. Part of the difficulty is that the exponents of natural rights have been in notorious disagreement about what those rights are. The outlook becomes more hopeful if instead of allowing ourselves to be bogged in interminable and perhaps irresolvable controversies about what can be deduced from a fixed human nature or essence, we look on declarations of human rights as the assertion of what men at any given moment believe, for perhaps quite different reasons, to be the right human choice. They are more of the nature of *decisions* than of *propositions*. This view has been ably presented by Dr. Margaret Macdonald in a paper to the Aristotelian Society.¹ "To assert that all men are equal," she maintains, "is not to state a fact, but to *choose a side*. It announces: *This is where I stand*."

Regarded from this point of view the adoption by the United Nations of so full a statement of human rights may be looked on as important. Just because of the difference in the religious and cultural backgrounds of the nations which adopted the Declaration, the wide measure of agreement about what is humanly desirable is remarkable; and it is noteworthy that the nations which abstained from voting in favour of the Declaration were unwilling openly to oppose it.

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1946-7.*

Even when we admit the force of Dr. Fletcher's realism, and give full weight to the fact of the powerlessness of mere ideals over against an intractable world of fact and circumstance, we can still attach some value to this expression of world opinion. It suggests that belief in the dignity and worth of man dies hard, and even takes on new vigour at times when human freedoms are under attack. Some of the formulations in the present Declaration are vague and imprecise, and therefore of little practical use; they must be given content. The precise meaning of freedom from arbitrary arrest, for example, may need much clearer definition, but everyone understands in general what is here condemned, and the fact that a large majority of the nations of the world have said that they do not like it is a fact not to be altogether dismissed.

AIMS IN POLITICS

The discussion on the relation between Christianity and Politics which was introduced by Supplements by Mr. Christopher Hollis and Mr. Woodrow Wyatt (C.N-L. Nos. 218 and 224), and which we hope to pursue, has brought us a comment from one of our readers which emphasizes an important issue in the debate. The writer says:

"Mr. Hollis and Major Wyatt have initiated a most important and interesting discussion on the relation between Christianity and politics, but some vital points seem to have escaped them. The assumption underlying both arguments appears to be that politics is primarily concerned with aims, and the discussion consequently turns on a criticism of the aims of Socialism from a Christian point of view. Now this assumption that politics is mainly a matter of aims, with its corollary that the Christian should support the party whose aims are in closest accord with Christianity, seems to me to be a most dangerous hangover from liberal rationalism. The business of the statesman is not to evaluate aims *in vacuo*, as though their attainment costs nothing; rather is it his task to use his powers of foresight and his knowledge of history to assess the cost of attaining those aims and, in the light of that assessment, to decide whether the aims are worth the cost. For there are few, if any, worthwhile aims

whose realization does not exact some price. There are consequently many features of our society in themselves undesirable ; but when we realize they constitute the price we have to pay for other highly desirable features we do well to leave them alone.

“ Those of us who are concerned at the trend of Socialist legislation are so concerned, not because we quarrel with the aims of Socialism when considered in isolation, but because we believe that many of those aims are not worth the inordinately high price in the loss of liberty and personal responsibility which they will, in our judgment, inevitably exact. So much of Socialist—and often of Conservative—thinking seems to be vitiated by the rationalist illusion that good intentions are all that is required, and to ignore the lessons of history that revolutions seldom attain the aims they set out to achieve. What could have seemed more Christian than the aims of the French Revolution, and what less Christian than the result ?

“ If Christianity has one major interest in politics, it is surely the preservation of liberty as the only possible environment for spiritual growth and the exercise of personal responsibility. Yet Socialism is removing the very foundations upon which our liberty rests. It is important to realize that our freedom as a people is secured, not by conscious determination, but by our political and economic institutions. If democracy means anything at all it means that the people control the State ; yet the increasing centralization of economic ownership would seem to place the people in the power of the State, as the latter becomes less and less obliged to go to the people for financial supplies to carry on the business of government. Where, in fact, do we stop short of totalitarianism ? Socialists appear to think that we can call a halt to the process where and when we will. But once you commit yourselves to far-reaching political aims you inevitably commit yourselves to the logical conclusion of those aims, unless you are prepared to face up to a revolution to reverse the process.”

We welcome this emphatic reminder that to think of politics primarily in terms of aims is to miss altogether the

real nature of the political struggle. This is true in a double sense. In the first place, as our correspondent asserts, the realization of any particular aim can in practice only be achieved by the neglect or postponement of other aims. As a general truth this applies equally to the political aim of the preservation of liberty, which he holds to be the major interest of Christianity ; some freedoms of individuals or of particular classes may have to be sacrificed in order that others may enjoy more important freedoms or be accorded their just rights. But also, secondly, in laying the primary stress on aims we are in danger, as Canon V. A. Demant is always reminding us,¹ of forgetting the complete impotence of professed aims when the social structures, which by their perpetual suggestion form the soul, and the forces which give direction and tone to men's emotional life are working in a contrary direction.

A WOUNDED NAME

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton, who was during the war a Wing-Commander in the R.A.F., has recently returned from a visit of some weeks to the British and French zones in Germany. In the light of what he found there he has in a letter to *The Observer* (15th December, 1948) reiterated a demand made more than two years ago by Professor Cyril Falls, the military correspondent of *The Times*, in an article in that newspaper, for a public enquiry into our treatment of German prisoners of war in Germany. In this article Professor Falls referred to disquieting reports containing charges not only of ghastly under-nourishment but also of direct physical maltreatment. The graver the charges, he insisted, the more essential it is that the windows should be opened to admit light and air to any corners that may hide foulness. Such action would be in accord with traditional British practice.

Since then there has taken place the Nenndorf trial last spring, in which the summing up of the Judge Advocate left no doubt that in the interrogation methods adopted in

¹ e.g., in a remarkable Supplement (C.N.-L. No. 257) on "The Mischief of Ideals". Cf. an essay under the same title in his *Theology of Society* (Faber & Faber, 10s. 6d.) and a paper on "The Aims and Assumptions of our Culture" in *Our Culture* (S.P.C.K. 5s.)

the Nenndorf camp violence had been used to extort admissions. That means torture. The Nenndorf trial receives little attention in this country and has now been almost entirely forgotten. But in Germany, Lord Malcolm tells us it has become "a byword, gloated over by many whose sole purpose it is to make light of Nazi crimes, and mentioned in furtive whispers by those who have suffered in the interrogation camp. I am confident that the Nenndorf story as circulated in Germany contains lies and exaggerations. But I am certain that enough has happened to make our people angry and ashamed once they are properly enlightened. There would then be an outcry making manifest the true will of the country and embarrassing the slanderers. If, on the other hand, we conveniently forget what the Germans remember, this scandal will fester in the annals of history.

Lord Malcolm has come back from Germany determined to do all that he can to press the demand for a public enquiry in order that we may "heal a wounded name". He is convinced that there is within the Control Commission a strong body of opinion that would welcome such an enquiry. What is needed is a reassurance that since VE Day the Geneva Convention, by the letter of which Britain was no longer bound after the unconditional surrender of Germany has been upheld in spirit. "We shall be bound by our conscience," Mr. Churchill promised before victory was won, and the nation as a whole is responsible for seeing that this promise is kept.

In this effort Lord Malcolm deserves all the support that can be given him. The issue for him is a spiritual struggle between Christian standards and their denial. There can be little doubt that, if Great Britain were to do the right thing in the right way, the effect on opinion in Germany and throughout the world would be far-reaching. It would be a signal witness to the principles in which we profess to believe.

We would also like to draw attention to a protest drawn up by the Roman Catholic Bishops of Germany at Fulda last August, of which the full text is given in the issue of the *New English Weekly* of December 30th. In language of great restraint the Bishops draw attention to some of the results

of the trials of war criminals held by the American Military Government at Nuremberg and Dachau and of subsequent de-nazification trials. These trials, they say, might have had a great moral effect: large numbers of German people were anxious that "crimes should be expiated and justice once more observed". But there have been strong suspicions that the fundamental principle of justice that all are equal before the law has been set aside. Ordinary citizens have been heavily punished "for obeying laws and ordinances which, even if contrary to the law of nations and to general moral standards, were yet those of their own country". The question whether a man was wrong, and if so how wrong, in rendering such obedience is so knotty a one that the same acts have been differently assessed and punished by different courts. "This makes it all the more incredible," say the Bishops, "that against the decision of these courts there should be no appeal." Knowing that the American people are filled with an active desire to see justice done" and that "in the United States criticism of the trials grows ever louder", the Bishops "urgently request that the persons sentenced shall have the right of appeal".

THE SUPPLEMENT

The Supplement in this issue came as an unsolicited response to our News-Letter on the Lambeth Conference and the British Association. We did not know that the writer was a reader of the C.N-L. Dr. Alex Comfort is the author of four volumes of verse, two plays, four novels, and two volumes of essays. That would be a notable output from one who had devoted himself entirely to literature. But Dr. Comfort has found time in addition to qualify as a doctor and is engaged in research at the London Hospital Medical College. He presents in this Supplement the view of one who is a humanist and non-theist. He is exceptionally sensitive to what is going on in the world, and we are sure that what he writes many of his generation are thinking. We are very glad to publish his statement. We shall offer some comments on the Supplement in our next issue.

Kathleen Bliss

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND RELIGIOUS ASSERTION

By ALEX COMFORT

A QUOTATION from an essay of mine which you have published (C.N-L. No. 323) leads me to hope that you may find room for comment on the status of modern humanism, not by way of reply so much as by way of supplement. The doubt which you express whether the younger generation of science would subscribe to the opinion of *Nature* about the *rapprochement* of science and religion seems to be justified, although the focus of difference between scientific and religious belief has shifted. The attitude of Lambeth was encouraging to scientific readers because it showed awareness of recent work in sociology and psychology—the difference between the two viewpoints remains, I feel, as pronounced as ever.

Scientific study of individuals and of societies does reveal deficiencies in the moral performance of man judged by his own standards. It also reveals, to an increasing degree, the exact character of those deficiencies, and since one of the main objects of the scientific method is to devise means of bringing man's circumstances into line with his aspirations, social psychology is active in trying to pin-point and correct moral deficiency on the same basis as medical science attacks deficient health. And while this preliminary work does not yet offer a technological solution of the problem of sin, it suggests very strongly that a solution in terms of social psychology is not a fundamental impossibility. The most recent position in this field is illustrated by a quotation from Fleming's new study on adolescence, a book which is not, in its final judgment, hostile to the idea of religious experience as a social influence :

"The child, the adolescent or adult is not merely a 'savage' or a beast, whose anti-social impulses towards self-assertion, cruelty or greed require to be restrained ; but a human being, social in nature ('a son of God') who is capable of evil as well as good, but who can find satisfaction only in the 'good'. In an atmosphere of frustration, aggression, discouragement and

neglect he will appear aggressive, cruel, anti-social, and inhibited, but the removal of such influences will result in the revelation of a new creature."

With this analysis many Christians, though not, I think, Dr. Niebuhr, would probably agree. I have taken a statement which has a religious cast deliberately, because it represents the closest approach to a compromise between sociology and Christian belief. The point about this sociological attitude, however, is that it is based not upon opinion but upon a study of man and of society. The evidence is available for discussion and refutation, but, in the absence of new facts, it does not appear likely to be refuted. To the results of study based on human conduct, the opponents of human sociality reply by assertion—and we are here upon ground where assertion can be tested.

I fully realize that the Christian doctrine of man is by no means unanimous, but I choose it as an illustration because it is a field which is generally admitted to fall into the scope of accurate scientific investigation. When we come to the larger issue of theism and of the significance of revealed morality, where the Christian witness is more uniform, exactly the same objection applies to separating the scientific from the religious viewpoint.

Victorian agnosticism was extremely alarmed by the practical effects of divorcing moral judgments from the religious absolutes. It owed its fears to the misconception of the absolute character of scientific and mathematical laws which it drew from Newtonian physics and Darwinian biology. The reason that modern science can confidently accept ethical relativism is that it has discovered the nature of its own findings in physical contexts more fully and more clearly—the conceptions of relativity and indeterminacy make us far less anxious to base our ethics on absolutes. In this newer science, measurement is geocentric, and standards and relations are anthropocentric. Science in general no longer believes that mathematical judgments have absolute significance apart from man, or that ethical judgments require an absolute basis if they are to be significant. We tend therefore to regard man's chief attribute differently—he is not a son of God, but the father of God.

There are two main views of ethical reality which can be argued—that right and wrong correspond to values which are attributes

either of God or of a god-like cosmos, or that they are the names which human beings give to groups of experience. Christianity has never hesitated to regard goodness as an attribute of God which we can only comprehend by revelation, and it is surprising that it has been prepared to accept the relativistic view of aesthetics, which are a parallel case. Christians would probably not be alarmed by the suggestion that beauty is a name which we give to certain types of experience, or that the term "beautiful" implies observers. How far a work of Beethoven would continue to be "beautiful" in the absence of a human audience is an academic point, but science, while it cannot make any categorical denial of either hypothesis of ethics, can say with confidence that there is no clear evidence to distinguish our ethical sense from any of our other types of mental classification, and that this ethical system of classification seems to be confined to man. If we rely on the evidence, we cannot detect any convincing sign of moral intention anywhere save in man. We are left with the probability not that a god created man, but that man has created a God, as he has created the emotional and the spiritual connotation of beauty.

This again is a view based on evidence—not conclusive, but suggestive evidence. To it, again, Christianity opposes assertion. While science has become materially less dogmatic and readier to regard its findings as provisional, religion has come to rely increasingly on assertion, and it rarely takes the pains to argue as fully as it did in the time of Aquinas.

Science would, I think, be able to accept the concept of a God who could not be investigated, but I can see no reason why it should accept a God whose existence cannot be directly inferred. If the Christian view of creation is true, then it seems certain that physical science will ultimately detect some sign of its truth, if only in the delimiting of a gap in knowledge which cannot be filled by direct investigation. Such gaps exist, but the Christian deity cannot be made to fit them. When we turn to the evidential basis of Christian belief, we find a body of historical testimony which is not fully convincing, a body of revelation which seems synonymous with intuitive assertion, and a body of mystical experience. Of these, the last is by far the most hopeful as a basis for true conclusions because it does at least

offer, however uncritically, an experimental approach to spiritual reality from which the objective existence of such a reality might be studied. There is a final body of argument which we might find equally cogent—if the pragmatic results of Christian practice were in fact superior, morally, humanly and spiritually to those of other systems, then the truth of Christianity would be supported, even if not proved. We have to admit that in spite of the claims of its adherents, Christianity cannot claim to have produced a higher proportion of social individuals and societies, or even a better set of results in terms of human character, than competing systems. The Victorian and Mediaeval views could accept this argument from results, because they equated civilization with sociality, and agnostics shared the Christian idea of the benighted condition of primitive societies. This view no longer holds any force. It seems doubtful if the results of the Christian ethic are markedly superior in terms of character to those of primitive sociality at its highest level. A comparison with a social order such as Nazism proves nothing, and might equally prove the truth of the religion of, say, the Trobriand islanders.

The gulf between scientific and religious views of man is to-day as wide as ever, and will remain so as long as religion depends for credence upon assertion, limiting its acceptance of evidence to non-essentials. While we may be wrong, we know that we may be wrong, and it is not claiming too much to say that science to-day is willing to criticize all its hypotheses, if the evidence requires it, since hypotheses, for it, are only concise statements of the evidence. A creed is not a hypothesis but a concise statement of certainty, and it dictates the form of subsequent inference. This was illustrated by Professor Hodges, in his recent discussion of the responsibility of God for evil—he there misrepresented the scientific method in a revealing way. His argument ran: "Our examination of the universe leads us to believe that a God, if there is a God, cannot escape the responsibility for evil: we know that this is not so, and we therefore hypothecate that it is not so, and seek for evidence to disprove it." In science, it is customary to frame the working hypothesis with, and not against the evidence, and however much humility science may have earned, it cannot accept knowledge not derived from observation at a higher rate of exchange than the evidence of experience.

I feel that Christians would have a closer comprehension of the position of scientific humanism, itself only a hypothesis, if they would recognize the intentions and methods of science and admit that the scientist is not making unlimited claims on truth. We do not reject Christianity because of its moral claims on the individual, but because we cannot accept a God whose working in the universe is not merely inscrutable but so well concealed as to leave no vestige of observable material to the unconvinced observer. The claim of theologians to possess a "private wire to God", and to have inside information which by-passes the normal processes of reasoning, is not one which science can ever view sympathetically.

The scientific position as I see it is this. Science makes no direct claim to finality of judgment, but it cannot accept the finality of other, non-observational judgment. It cannot express an opinion on the unobservable, but it can criticize suggestions that the unobservable exists, and where these suggestions intrude into observable fields it can refute them. Religion may take heart from the admissions of certain mathematicians that God is not incredible, but it should weigh the enormous gulf between the God which mathematicians envisage and the Christian deity, and it should recognize that such statements, even in their limited form, have no general acceptance in science. I think that we should understand one another better if Christian thought appreciated the readiness of science to modify its viewpoint in the light of evidence, and the inadmissibility by science of assertions unsupported by verifiable observation. And I do not feel that Christianity to-day is ready to subject its basic assumptions to equally candid criticism, or even to criticism as careful as it has finally agreed to apply to its historical documents. If the scientist is not convinced, I feel that it is because little attempt has been made to convince him, or because those who oppose him do not in fact possess evidence to justify their position.

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All communications and subscriptions should be sent to—
THE CHRISTIAN NEWS-LETTER, 20 BALCOMBE STREET, DORSET SQUARE, LONDON, N.W. 1

Published by the Christian Frontier Trust, Ltd., and printed in Great Britain
by the Church Army Press, Cowley, Oxford.